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When it comes to North Korea’s amenability to a durable agreement with the United States, Chinese influence on Pyongyang is crucial. But while Chinese President Xi Jinping thinks that this influence gives him leverage over the U.S., the opposite is actually true. China now needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs China. And if China fails to deliver on North Korea, the U.S. can greatly damage Chinese interests.

All of this bears note, considering North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s meetings with Xi in Beijing this week. Hoping to exchange viewpoints beyond U.S. intelligence detection, the Xi-Kim meetings precede a second summit between President Trump and Kim. That summit will likely occur by the end of March and is of instrumental importance. After all, Kim’s recent behavior indicates an intent to resume missile tests if a new summit does not lead to near-term international sanctions relief. The Trump administration is also growing impatient with Kim’s unwillingness to allow inspector access to his nuclear and ballistic missile facilities. The simple point here is that one side will have to move the diplomatic needle constructively, but neither side seems interested in doing so. The ingredients for a renewed crisis are coming together.

Xi knows all of this. The immensely powerful Chinese leader is also aware of American aggravation over Beijing’s breach of sanctions targeting Pyongyang. But Xi wrongly thinks that this gives him leverage over the U.S. The opposite is actually true.

Kim’s visit to Beijing proves as much. While Kim has been afforded heavy diplomatic prestige by Beijing, there is no question that Xi is the boss. It is only Xi who offers that which Kim most needs: steady resources and a diplomatic outlet. So, unless and until North Korea enters international trading structures, Kim must accept Xi’s direction, lest North Korea suffer an economic catastrophe that could lead to a coup or regime collapse. Moreover, seeing as Xi’s ultimate ambition is a new international order in which China grants patronage in return for absolute deference, he could ultimately cut off North Korea to send a message to other nations.

Ironically, here, it is Trump’s grand bargain that offers Kim mastery of his own destiny. At present, however, Kim must pay great heed to that which Xi directs. So, if Kim does not engage in significant confidence-building steps with the U.S. in the next few weeks, we can safely assume that Xi has given Kim his permission to keep playing games. But that invites another question: Why would Xi allow Kim’s negative action while China needs an economic deal from the U.S.?

The answer is simple: because Xi is comfortable taking risks in return for rewards. His ideal outcome to the North Korean nuclear crisis is one in which Pyongyang deploys its nuclear forces but also offers some kind of security guarantee that Trump accepts. That outcome would enable Xi to continue dangling his control over North Korea as a means of exerting concessions from the U.S., but with reduced risk of U.S. military action of the kind Trump threatened in 2017.

That outcome would also be a disaster for the U.S., keeping Kim in check only via Beijing’s expensive generosity or via military action that risks a nuclear exchange. To avoid that outcome but resolve this crisis diplomatically, Trump must challenge Xi at his own game. Trump should make clear to Xi that absent significant near-term North Korean concessions, he will hold Xi and Kim equally responsible. Trump should clarify that this will mean no U.S. trade deal with China (which Xi desperately needs in light of China’s economic weakening) and new sanctions on the Chinese financial sector.

Ultimately, though, America’s better interest here requires Trump to introduce Xi to one of the Chinese president’s favorite ideals: re-education. Xi must be helped to understand that his influence over Kim does not amount to leverage but to greater Chinese responsibility for the outcome. If Xi chooses to ignore that lesson, he must be made to face a painful economic and diplomatic detention.